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The relations between corporate economic performance, 
environmental disclosure and greenhouse gas emissions: new insights. 
Abstract 
This study examines the associations and causations between corporate economic 
performance, environmental disclosure and greenhouse gas emissions, utilising a large, 
longitudinal, multi-country dataset disaggregated between developed and developing 
countries. The methodology employs a simultaneous equation model with system estimation 
to deal with endogeneity between the variables, and Granger causality tests to indicate their 
direction of causation. A robust result is that lower emissions are strongly associated with better 
economic performance. After pretesting for stationarity, we find evidence of a one-way 
causation from emissions and environmental disclosure to economic performance, but no 
evidence of reverse causation. We also find strong evidence of a one-way causation from 
emissions to disclosure, but no evidence of reverse causation. The over-arching policy 
implication is that environmental performance, as measured by greenhouse gas emissions, 
plays a crucial role in the formulation of business strategy at firm level and government 
environmental policy at national and international levels.  
 
Key words: economic, environmental, performance, disclosure, greenhouse gases, 
environmental policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior studies typically focus on the pairwise associations between corporate economic 
performance (CEP), environmental disclosure (CED) and environmental performance using 
cross-sectional analysis based on small samples and one or a few countries. The proxies used 
for environmental disclosure and performance often suffer from measurement issues. By 
contrast, the current study employs a large-scale, longitudinal, multi-country dataset to analyse 
both the associations and causations between the variables, and utilises relatively new measures 
for environmental disclosure and performance, i.e. the Bloomberg environmental disclosure 
score and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) respectively. These provide consistent, comparable 
measures across companies, countries and time, increasing the replicability of our results and 
hence their comparability with future studies. 
Given potential endogeneity between CEP, CED and GHG, we employ a simultaneous 
equation model and system methods to estimate the variable associations. The problem of 
endogeneity in this context is wider than commonly recognised because studies often analyse 
the association between two of the three variables without considering the influence of the 
third. If the three variables are co-determined, such model misspecification will result in biased 
and inconsistent coefficient estimates. A novel feature of our study is the use of the Granger 
causality test to examine the direction of causation between the variables of interest. Tests of 
association are not, strictly speaking, tests of causation, although they are sometimes 
interpreted as such. The Granger test provides extra information on the nature of the causal 
relationship between variables.   
There are a number of ways to measure environmental performance. Our preferred 
measure, greenhouse gas emissions (such as carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane), 
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captures the fundamental influence of corporate economic performance on climate change, i.e. 
a large-scale, long-term shift in the planet's weather patterns or average temperatures (Met 
Office, UK). Business sector concern over environmental issues, particularly climate change, 
has produced a sharper focus and ongoing debate on the relations between CEP, CED and 
GHG. Two types of business risk are associated with GHG and climate change: the direct effect 
of climate change through changes in weather patterns, rising sea levels and dangerous changes 
in patterns of drought and flooding, and the indirect effect via regulatory intervention including 
abatement and liability costs arising from taxes and trading schemes (Kim and Lyon, 2011, p. 
2). These risks constitute significant threats to corporate economic performance generally, and 
exert pressure on firms to improve their own environmental performance. Risk evaluation is 
further complicated by the fact that climate change and business risks are distributed unevenly 
across the globe with significant regional differences (Romilly, 2005; 2007). The central issue 
is whether it pays firms to be good to the environment and, if so, what the nature of the causality 
is. Does good economic performance cause good environmental performance, or vice versa, or 
is there two-way causation? Such differences in causative influence have implications for 
policy formulation.  
Another important issue is how much information a firm should disclose about its 
environmental performance: should poorer environmental performers disclose more or less 
information about their performance, bearing in mind the market reaction to such disclosure? 
The literature provides contrasting theories on the relationship. Voluntary disclosure and 
signalling theories predict a positive association between environmental performance and 
disclosure, i.e. better performers disclose more environmental information voluntarily to 
distinguish themselves from poorer performers. Alternatively, legitimacy theory argues that 
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poorer performers face socio-political pressures to disclose more environmental information 
voluntarily to change perceptions and “legitimise” their activities. In this view, it is poorer 
performers who disclose more. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Furthermore, less 
is known about how environmental disclosure might impact environmental performance both 
in theory and practice (Luo et al., 2012; Matisoff, 2013; Lewis et al., 2014). Although there is 
a cost for reporting environmental information, the information can shed light on areas of 
concern such as “hot spots” in energy consumption, water usage, greenhouse gas emissions, 
and hazardous and toxic waste, so that companies can take actions to deal with them. The 
reported information may also help identify and manage risks and opportunities associated with 
climate change and improve company reputation by adopting a proactive approach (Sullivan 
and Gouldson, 2012).  
The resulting debates have spawned an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on 
the associations between corporate economic performance, environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance, but the conclusions from this literature, particularly from 
empirical studies, are decidedly mixed. Reasons include methodological and measurement 
problems in the constructs of interest, lack of a temporal dimension in the data, omitted variable 
bias and inadequate sampling procedures (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Patten, 2002; 
Clarkson et al., 2008; Endrikat et al., 2014). The prevalence of small samples raises concern 
over the robustness of the estimation results and limits the ability to generalise findings to 
different settings (e.g., Walls et al., 2012; Lewis et al., 2014; Zhao and Murrell, 2016).  
We do not explore in depth the many theoretical issues in this area, although we do 
provide background commentary where appropriate. Our focus is on advancing the empirical 
literature through the analysis of a large-scale dataset using system estimation as well as 
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Granger causation tests. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no other study in this area 
(excluding meta-analytic studies) uses as many observations, and no other study uses Granger 
causation testing. This focus is supported by the observation that, whilst empirical work on the 
estimated pairwise associations between the variables is voluminous, particularly for cross-
sectional data, much less research has been conducted on their contemporaneous association 
(including appropriate control variables) and their direction of causation (Walls et al. 2012; 
Nollet et al. 2016).   
 The use of cross-section analysis in prior studies (e.g., Freedman and Patten, 2004; 
Lorraine et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2014) imposes a number of 
limitations, including the representativeness of the examined time period, i.e. the one point in 
time covered in the analysis, and whether the observed associations among the variables of 
interest hold over time. Delmas and Blass (2010) highlight the problems of using static data in 
the case where a firm has a one-time incident in the year in question or when data is not 
available for the same year for all companies. Also, the omission of temporal considerations 
may produce unstable results in cross-section analysis (Murray et al., 2006). Perhaps the most 
significant limitation, however, is the difficulty of identifying causative variable relationships. 
We employ both cross-section and time series data (panel data), which gives the researcher a 
larger number of observations, increasing degrees of freedom in statistical testing and reducing 
the problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, thus improving estimation 
efficiency (Hsiao, 2002). The availability of time series data enables the use of Granger 
causation tests, and by considering potential dynamics in the model specification we also 
respond to research calls to investigate how prior environmental disclosure impacts current 
environmental performance (Luo et al., 2012; Matisoff, 2013; Lewis et al., 2014).  
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The current study fills these gaps by examining both the associations and causations 
between CEP, CED and GHG, utilising a dataset comprising 9,120 firm-year observations from 
45 countries worldwide. The analysis is disaggregated between developed and developing 
countries. The research methodology is as follows. First, we employ a simultaneous equation 
model to estimate the associations between CEP, CED and GHG. In doing so, we address the 
issue of variable co-determination by the use of a Hausman test. Second, after pretesting for 
variable stationarity, we conduct Granger causality tests to determine their direction of 
causation. The study employs relatively new measures of corporate environmental 
performance and disclosure to facilitate estimation across countries, companies, and time, as 
well as a diverse range of firm and country-level variables spanning macroeconomic, 
environmental, corporate performance and governance characteristics to provide greater 
control for omitted variable bias.  
More specifically, in terms of corporate environmental performance, the literature is 
largely informed by US studies where researchers tend to use either qualitative rankings such 
as those of the Council of Economic Priorities (e.g., Freedman and Wasley, 1990; Hughes et 
al., 2001; Cho and Patten, 2007), or Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Company (KLD; recently 
the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index), or the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) published by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (e.g., Patten, 2002;  Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Clarkson et al., 
2008; Clarkson et al., 2011a). As a result, in a literature review of proxies for corporate 
environmental performance, Dragomir (2012) conjectures that environmental performance 
research tends to be localised due to data availability, an observation supported by the lack of 
larger-scale cross-country studies. In contrast, our measure of environmental performance, i.e. 
greenhouse gas emissions (millions of metric tonnes), is comparable across countries and 
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relates directly to what many believe is the greatest existential threat to our planetary well-
being, namely climate change (Ibid, p. 225).   
In terms of environmental disclosure, Bloomberg’s environmental disclosure score 
provides incremental environmental information over and above what is already known about 
the firm’s environmental performance. The score covers 60 different environmental data points 
including information about energy consumption and emissions, waste data, environmental 
initiatives, and environmental policies (see Qiu et al. (2016) for a list of these data points). Data 
sources include companies’ annual reports, sustainability reports, press releases and third party 
research. The common use of content analysis and self-constructed disclosure indices to 
measure environmental disclosure (e.g., Bewley and Li, 2000; Patten, 2002; Freedman and 
Patten, 2004; Cho and Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Plumlee et al., 
2015) has the benefit that such metrics can be designed to fit the project (e.g., country, 
voluntary and/or mandatory disclosure), but they are mostly subjective and study-specific 
measures which limit the comparability of estimation results. The Bloomberg environmental 
disclosure score is more comprehensive, and available for a large number of companies and 
countries over multiple time periods.  
An important and distinctive result from our association tests is the robust and 
consistently negative association between CEP and GHG for both developed and developing 
countries. This result implies that lower GHG (better environmental performance) is strongly 
associated with better economic performance. In terms of causation, the novel results from the 
Granger causality tests demonstrate a one-way causation from GHG to both CED and CEP and 
a one-way causation from CED to CEP. Taken together, these association and causation results 
add to our knowledge and understanding of the relationships in the CEP, CED and GHG troika. 
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The over-arching implication for business strategy and government policy is the crucial role of 
environmental performance, as measured by greenhouse gas emissions. We recognise this 
finding might surprise those commentators who tend to downplay the importance of 
environmental factors in corporate economic performance, and we speculate on the reason for 
the finding in section 5.  Nonetheless, given the size and scope of our dataset, as well as variable 
measurement and analysis, our findings are likely to possess greater generality and robustness 
than those from previous studies. In addition, the knowledge concerning the causation between 
the three variables will hopefully inform future academic studies in developing their research 
models. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant 
literature and develop our hypotheses. The model specification is presented in section 3, while 
section 4 describes the sample and the results. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results 
and concluding remarks.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 The relation between corporate environmental performance and disclosure  
The literature provides two contrasting theoretical frameworks in this area with mixed 
empirical results. First, voluntary disclosure and signalling theories (Verrecchia, 1983; Li et 
al., 1997) predict a positive association between environmental performance and disclosure, 
i.e. better performers disclose more environmental information voluntarily in order to 
distinguish themselves from poorer performers. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. 
(2008) find evidence for this view. The second theoretical framework is based on social and 
political theories (Gray et al., 1995), which view environmental disclosure as a function of 
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social and political pressures directed particularly towards poorer performers and thus predict 
a negative association between environmental performance and disclosure. This view often 
relies on legitimacy theory to explain how poorer performers face more socio-political 
pressures and have greater incentives to disclose more environmental information voluntarily 
in order to change perceptions and thereby “legitimise” their activities. Examples of supporting 
empirical studies include Bewley and Li (2000), Patten (2002), Cho and Patten (2007), and 
Clarkson et al. (2011a).  
 Other studies, however, find no association between environmental disclosure and 
performance (e.g., Freedman and Wasley, 1990; Fekrat et al., 1996). One reason for the mixed 
results is the use of different proxies for environmental performance and disclosure. Delmas 
and Blass (2010, p. 246-247) note the diversity of corporate environmental performance 
indicators, which are usually divided into three main categories: (1) environmental impact 
(toxicity, emissions, energy use etc.); (2) regulatory compliance (non-compliance status, 
violation fees, number of audits etc.) and (3) organisational processes (environmental 
accounting, audits, reporting, environmental management system etc.). Even where the proxies 
for environmental disclosure and performance are related, for example proxies using GHG, 
studies still report mixed results (e.g., Freedman and Jaggi, 2004; 2011; Kim and Lyon, 2011; 
Luo and Tang, 2014). Freedman and Jaggi (2004) find firms that emit the most carbon dioxide 
provide the most extensive disclosures, while Luo and Tang (2014) find that lower emissions 
are associated with more environmental disclosure. On the other hand, Freedman and Jaggi 
(2011) find no significant association between GHG disclosures and carbon emissions. 
Measurement problems also include subjective measures of disclosure which hinder 
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generalisability and comparability of the results, and samples which are small and insufficiently 
diversified to provide meaningful inference (Patten, 2002).   
 Overall, the empirical results have been questioned in terms of both methodological 
and measurement problems (e.g., Patten, 2002; Clarkson et al., 2008). Early studies often report 
simple correlations between corporate environmental performance and disclosure without 
controlling for other factors (e.g., Freedman and Jaggi, 1982; Freedman and Wasley, 1990; 
Fekrat et al., 1996), while subsequent studies address this deficiency by conducting multiple 
regression analysis but without controlling for variable endogeneity (e.g., Patten, 2002; 
Clarkson et al., 2008; Luo and Tang, 2014). Even where structural modelling is used, many 
studies rely on cross-section data and thus lack a temporal dimension. This limitation on model 
dynamics may account for the birth of the contrasting theoretical frameworks. For example, if 
poorer performers disclose more current information which leads to better future performance, 
both legitimacy and voluntary disclosure theories could lay partial claim to explain this type of 
behaviour. 
Furthermore, there is uncertainty about how environmental disclosure can impact 
environmental performance, leading to calls for more research in this area. Lewis et al. (2014) 
observe that whilst some scholars maintain that environmental disclosure can lead to 
performance improvement by raising the legitimacy of environmental issues within the firm or 
by generating external scrutiny, it is common knowledge that firms sometimes comply 
symbolically with pressures without making substantive changes to their organisational 
procedures. In other words, environmental disclosure can be a form of “greenwash” rather than 
a genuine attempt to improve performance. 
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Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) argue that environmental disclosure might affect 
environmental performance by creating a “lower bound” for investors’ expectations. If a firm’s 
environmental performance deteriorates (without disclosure) and reduces stock price, then 
shareholders may have grounds for litigation. The management’s reputation for providing 
credible disclosures might also suffer. In addition, corporate environmental disclosure can  
increase awareness about potential environmental risks and opportunities, particularly those 
associated with climate change, and improve company reputation by adopting a proactive 
approach to tackling them (Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012).  
 
This view coincides with the management-orientation perspective suggested by Qian 
and Schaltegger (2017), in which corporate environmental disclosure can be used as a 
management tool to create organisational pressure and incentives to drive actions and achieve 
carbon reduction and performance improvement. The authors examine the association between 
changes in carbon disclosure and subsequent changes in carbon performance for a sample of 
Global Fortune 500 companies for the period 2008 to 2012. They find that changes in carbon 
disclosure are positively associated with subsequent changes in carbon performance. The result 
suggests that if carbon disclosure improves, firms are motivated and capable of using disclosure 
as an ‘outside-in’ opportunity to create change and improve their carbon performance. The 
results are based on tests of association rather than causation, however, and a test on the reverse 
hypothesis (i.e. changes in carbon performance are associated with subsequent changes in 
carbon disclosure) is precluded within the study remit.   
Given the diverse findings in this area, we propose to test the following non-
directional null hypothesis: 
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H1: There is no significant association between corporate environmental disclosure 
and environmental performance. 
2.2 The relation between corporate environmental and economic performance 
The central question in the environmental-economic performance literature is whether 
it pays firms to be good to the environment. Good environmental performance might impact 
economic performance positively through cost-saving, cost or liability avoidance, revenue 
generation or being an exemplar for best practice (Murray et al., 2006). Another justification 
for a positive relationship is that if environmental pollution represents inefficient resource 
usage then its reduction or elimination will benefit both the environment and the bottom line 
(Porter and van der Linde, 1995). An early contribution by Friedman (1962), however, 
emphasises the trade-off between firm profitability and corporate social responsibility. In this 
view, improving environmental performance is costly and thus detrimental to economic 
performance, implying a negative relationship between corporate environmental and economic 
performance. But later studies point to an opposite conclusion justified by the idea of 
complementarity rather than trade-offs (e.g., Bragdon and Marlin, 1972; Spicer, 1978; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). A number of studies, however, find no significant association 
between the variables (e.g., Rockness et al., 1986; Freedman and Jaggi, 1992). Van Beurden 
and Gossling (2008) find a positive association between corporate social responsibility and 
economic performance, a result supported by the findings of Clarkson et al. (2011b) among 
others. A large scale study (Endrikat et al., 2014) conducts a meta-analytic review of 149 
studies on the environmental-economic performance relation and reaches broadly the same 
finding, namely that the relationship is generally positive. Another meta-analytic review (Lu 
and Taylor, 2016) reaches similar conclusions. A number of studies focusing on greenhouse 
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gas emissions as the measure of environmental performance conclude that good environmental 
performance is associated with good economic performance (e.g., Chapple et al., 2013; 
Matsumura et al., 2014; Clarkson et al., 2015; Baboukardos, 2017), but others still report mixed 
results (e.g., Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Zhao and Murrell, 2016; Nollet et al. 2016). 
Overall, the results of these numerous empirical studies are inconclusive. 
Methodological and measurement problems are typically cited as the culprits. McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) highlight the issue of omitted variable bias, whilst Van Beurden and Gossling 
(2008) point to the inconsistency in variable definitions, the inconsistency in how each concept 
is measured, and inconsistent research design. Accordingly, we propose the following non-
directional null hypothesis:  
H2: There is no significant association between greenhouse gas emissions and 
corporate economic performance.  
2.3 The relation between corporate environmental disclosure and economic performance  
Both signalling and legitimacy theories have been used to explain how CEP impacts 
CED, but there is a lack of a clear theoretical framework on how CED impacts CEP. One 
suggestion from voluntary disclosure theory is that credible environmental disclosure which 
conveys information over and above what investors already know about firm environmental 
performance impacts economic performance by facilitating financial performance prediction 
and/or reducing the cost of capital (Clarkson et al., 2013).   
Murray et al. (2006) explore whether there is any relationship between social and 
environmental disclosure and financial market performance for a sample of 100 large UK 
companies over the period 1989 to 1997. Based on a total of 660 instances of disclosure they 
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find no association between share returns and disclosure. However, their results show that 
companies with consistently higher (lower) returns are likely to have consistently higher 
(lower) levels of total and voluntary social and environmental disclosure in their annual reports. 
The study also finds that although the relationship for the sample period is strong, the cross-
section (i.e. year on year) results are insignificant and unstable, suggesting that a panel data 
analysis would generate more consistent results. Lorraine et al. (2004) examine the effect of 
environmental news on share prices using a cross-sectional analysis of a small UK sample of 
32 companies (9 with good news and 23 with bad news). The results provide limited evidence 
of a lagged market reaction to bad environmental news (i.e. fines due to breaches of 
regulations). Jacobs et al. (2010) examine market reaction to 780 environmental performance 
announcements for a sample of 340 US companies between the periods 2004 to 2006 and find 
that the market is selective in its reaction to different types of environmental announcements. 
For example, while announcements of philanthropic gifts for environmental causes and ISO 
14001 certifications are associated with significant positive market reaction, voluntary 
emission reductions are associated with significant negative market reaction.  
An event study conducted by Gupta and Goldar (2005) to investigate the impact of 
environmental rating announcements on the stock prices of 50 large Indian firms for the years 
1999, 2001 and 2002 finds that the announcement of weak environmental performance was 
associated with negative abnormal returns of up to 30 percent. Freedman and Patten (2004) 
examine the impact of both environmental performance, measured by the Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI), and environmental disclosure on market performance using a cross-sectional 
analysis of 112 US firms. Their purpose was to study market reaction to the unexpected 
proposal by President George Bush in June 1989 for revisions to the Clean Air Act and to 
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identify the impacts of TRI information and 10-K report environmental disclosures. Their 
results show a negative market reaction to poor environmental performance and a positive 
reaction to environmental disclosure.  
Some studies examine the association between CED and CEP after controlling for 
environmental performance (e.g., Freedman and Patten, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2013; Plumlee 
et al., 2015) and generally document a positive association between CED and CEP. For 
example, based on a sample of 474 US firms over a six-year period (2000-2005), Plumlee et 
al. (2015) examine the value relevance of environmental disclosure: their results suggest that 
voluntary environmental disclosure is associated with firm value through cash flow and cost of 
equity components, whilst both the type and nature of disclosures are informative in predicting 
firm value.  
In spite of this large body of empirical work, the results are far from conclusive and 
difficult to generalise because of the variety of metrics used for both the environmental 
disclosure and economic performance variables. Consequently, we again prefer to frame our 
research hypothesis in terms of a non-directional null hypothesis:  
H3: There is no significant association between corporate environmental disclosure 
and economic performance.  
3. Research model 
In this section, the associations between CEP, CED and GHG are examined by means 
of structural equations controlling for potential endogeneity and employing a range of control 
variables. The direction of causation between the variables is examined by means of Granger 
causality tests in the next section.  
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 Management strategy is fundamental in determining what a firm does and how it 
performs, but it is difficult to measure. In a survey of US firms, Ullman (1985) argued that 
management strategy (in its widest sense) co-determines economic performance, 
environmental performance and disclosure, and that the omission of this variable from the 
study methodologies caused an endogeneity problem. Failure to allow for this endogeneity 
results in biased and inconsistent estimators if ordinary (OLS) or generalised least squares 
(GLS) single-equation estimation is used.  In the absence of a suitable metric for management 
strategy, the endogeneity problem can be addressed by system estimation.  
 We develop a simultaneous three-equation model within which to conduct system 
estimation. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the only other study to adopt this 
methodology in this area appears to be that of Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), which uses a cross-
sectional sample of 198 large US firms and compares the OLS estimates with two- and three-
stage least squares estimates. But a self-constructed disclosure index is used to measure CED, 
and the authors acknowledge that their measure of environmental performance (the ratio of 
toxic waste recycled to total toxic waste generated) does not capture the relative toxicity of the 
waste being recycled. The current study methodology features important differences that 
continue to further our understanding of the CEP, CED and GHG relations. It uses both time 
series and cross-section data with a greater number of observations and a wider range of firm-
level and country-level control variables, as well as more general measures of environmental 
performance and disclosure. In particular, the presence of time series data enables the use of 
Granger causality testing. The statistical power of both studies is compared in section 4.3.   
 Environmental disclosure is generally made some months after greenhouse gas 
emissions have occurred and after the financial year-end, implying that environmental 
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disclosure cannot have a contemporaneous association with economic or environmental 
performance. It is possible, however, that environmental disclosure has a lagged association 
with GHG and CEP, and there is empirical evidence for this link from other studies (e.g., 
Lorraine et al., 2004). This possibility is allowed for in the model specification, although it is 
assumed that economic and environmental performance can have a contemporaneous 
association with environmental disclosure. We propose the following model specification 
(cross-section and time identifiers are suppressed for simplicity) to test the research hypotheses 
developed in the previous section: 
(1)  =  + 	

 + 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3.1 Endogenous variables 
CEP = Corporate economic performance measured by Tobin’s Q ratio ((market 
capitalisation + total liabilities + preferred equity + minority interest) / total assets). Tobin’s Q 
ratio is used as a proxy for firm economic performance in numerous related studies (e.g., King 
and Lenox, 2001; Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Zhao and Murrell, 2016), with a higher ratio 
indicating a better economic performance. In general, studies have used either accounting-
based measures (such as return on assets, return on equity and leverage) or market-based 
measures (such as Tobin’s Q ratio, firm value, stock returns) to proxy for firm economic 
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performance. While accounting-based measures focus on the past performance of a firm (e.g., 
Malarvizhi  and Matta, 2016; Lee at al., 2016; Qiu et al., 2016; Czerny and Letmathe, 2017), 
market-based measures (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2013; Plumlee et al., 2015; Yadav et al., 2016) 
reflect the market’s perception of its future economic performance. Accounting-based 
measures focus on the efficiency of internal decision making in the use of firm resources, but 
can be subject to management manipulation. Market-based measures are less prone to 
differences in accounting procedures and management manipulation, but assume market 
efficiency where full market efficiency is at best an unrealistic case (McGuire et al., 1988). To 
allow for these considerations, we use a market-based measure in the main analysis and check 
the robustness of our results by replacing the market-based measure with accounting-based 
measures, i.e. return on assets and return on equity. 
GHG = Environmental performance measured by greenhouse gas emissions (millions 
of metric tonnes) or, if unavailable, by carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This allows 
comparability across companies that report either GHG or CO2 emissions, but not both. The 
difference between the two measures is small. GHG or CO2 emissions have been used in a 
number of studies to proxy for environmental performance (e.g., Freedman and Jaggi, 2011; 
Kim and Lyon; 2011; Aperies et al., 2013; Luo and Tang; 2014). GHG data is available for 
many companies and provides a consistent and general measure for environmental performance 
across companies, countries and time. 
CED = Environmental disclosure score, which is a proprietary Bloomberg score based 
on the extent of a company's environmental disclosure. It is a subset of the Bloomberg ESG 
disclosure score, which quantifies a company’s transparency in reporting environmental, social 
and governance data, and has been used in a number of recent related academic studies (e.g., 
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Nollet et al., 2016; Qiu et al., 2016; Bernardi and Stark, 2016). The environmental disclosure 
score is weighted to emphasise the most commonly disclosed fields such as greenhouse gas 
emissions and normalised to range from zero for companies that do not disclose environmental 
information to 100 for those which disclose every data point collected. In addition, Bloomberg 
accounts for industry-specific disclosures by normalising the final score based only on a 
selected set of fields applicable to the industry type. For example, “Total Power Generated” is 
counted into the disclosure score of utility companies only.  
We choose this proxy for environmental disclosure because the environmental 
disclosure is made on a voluntary basis and hence is subject to management discretion. This 
contrasts with the Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index (CDLI) provided by the Carbon 
Disclosure Project, which is perceived as solicited disclosure that companies provide in 
response to pressure from institutional investors (Van der Laan, 2009), thereby limiting 
management discretion over what, where, how and when to disclose environmental 
information.  
The Bloomberg measure covers a wide range of environmental information such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, total energy consumption, total water use, total waste, number of 
spills, environmental initiatives, and environmental policies. Thus, it captures the incremental 
impact of environmental disclosure over and above what investors already know about firm 
environmental performance using GHG or CO2 emissions (Clarkson et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, as previously noted, the proxy is comparable across industries and countries, in 
contrast to self-constructed methods such as content analysis and disclosure indexes. 
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3.2 Predetermined variables 
Firm-level control variables 
These consist of firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and capital expenditure (CAP) (e.g., 
Walls et al., 2012; Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Nollet et al., 2016; Zhao and Murrell, 2016). SIZE 
is measured by turnover (US$ millions) less an adjustment for items such as returns and 
discounts. LEV is financial leverage measured as net debt to equity as a proxy for financial risk. 
CAP is capital expenditure as a proxy for firm efficiency in the deployment of its assets. It 
reflects the total amount the company spent on the purchase of tangible fixed assets to maintain 
production and generate revenue (Qian and Schaltegger, 2017).    
Turning to the expected coefficient signs, the SIZE effect in equation (1) is ambiguous 
because the effect of firm size on economic performance depends partly on the nature and 
extent of scale economies available to the firm. The SIZE effect in equation (2), however, is 
less ambiguous: after controlling for industry type (IND) we expect larger firms to emit more 
greenhouse gases. The SIZE effect in equation (3) is predicted to be positive, because larger 
firms are expected to disclose more voluntary information compared to smaller firms (e.g., Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Freedman and Jaggi, 2011; Luo and Tang, 2014).  CAP is expected to be 
positively associated with CEP (King and Lenox, 2001; Walls et al., 2012) and LEV to be 
negatively related (Nollet et al.  2016; Misani and Pogutz, 2015).   
Three proxies are included for board characteristics, namely board size (BSZ), chief 
executive officer duality (CEO) and gender diversity (WBO). BSZ is board size measured by 
the number of full time directors on the company's board. CEO is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the company's chief executive officer is also the chairman of the board and zero 
if the two roles are separate. WBO is the proportion of women on the board of directors. Board 
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characteristics have been related to firm performance and disclosure practice in prior studies 
with mixed results (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Freedman and Jaggi, 2011; Walls et al., 2012; Liao et 
al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2014; Li et al., 2017), so we do not predict the coefficient sign for these 
variables. 
Other firm-level control variables are the existence of a climate change policy (CHP), 
the existence of an energy efficiency policy (ENG), and industry type (IND) (e.g., Madsen and 
Ulhøi, 2016; Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Lewis et al., 2014; Walls et al., 2012). CHP equals one 
if the firm has a climate change policy describing its commitment to reduce GHG through its 
ongoing operations and/or the use of its products and services and zero otherwise. Examples 
of CHP include efforts to reduce GHG, improve energy efficiency, derive energy from cleaner 
fuel sources, and investment in product development to reduce emissions or energy consumed 
in the use of the company's products. We expect companies with a CHP to disclose more 
environmental information compared to companies without such a policy. ENG equals one if 
the company has reported implementing initiatives to make its energy use more efficient and 
zero if the company has not explicitly disclosed any such efforts in its annual or company 
responsibility reports. The impact of ENG on GHG in equation (2) is expected to be negative, 
since greater energy efficiency should reduce greenhouse gas emissions. IND equals one if the 
firm is in the industrial, energy or utility sectors according to the Bloomberg Industry 
Classification System (BICS) and zero otherwise.  Companies in these sectors are expected to 
have higher GHG or CO2 emissions, ceteris paribus.  
Country-level control variables 
We include three variables to control for country differences: GDP, KYO and CCGP 
(e.g., Apergis et al., 2013; Kim and Lyon, 2011). GDP is the gross domestic product per capita 
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(US$ current prices) in the firm’s country of origin, KYO is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the Kyoto Protocol is in force in the firm’s country of origin and zero otherwise, and 
CCGP is the first principal component of corporate governance indicators at country level. This 
measure is derived from six corporate governance indicators: control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability. These indicators range from -2.5 to +2.5 and 
are highly correlated. We apply principal component analysis to these indicators (results not 
tabulated) and use the first principal component (CCGP) in the subsequent analysis. This 
CCGP component explains 87 percent of the variation in the original six corporate governance 
indicators. 
Our study period spans the financial crash starting in 2007. The GDP variable acts as a 
control for the differential country shocks experienced in the wake of the crash as well as a 
measure of economic development. Higher GDP per capita (and CCGP) are expected to be 
associated with more efficient capital, currency and product markets as well as a better 
economic performance and information environment. Accordingly, we predict a positive 
relationship between both GDP and CCGP with CEP and CED in equations (1) and (3) 
respectively. In equation (2) we expect a higher GDP to be associated with higher levels of 
economic activity and higher greenhouse gas emissions, implying a positive relationship, 
although there is a possibility that a higher standard of living induces greater public and 
government pressure to reduce the firm’s environmental footprint, implying a negative 
relationship. A similar argument applies to CCGP. In equation (3), we expect companies 
originating in countries signed up to the Kyoto Protocol to disclose more in response to 
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government regulation and/or public pressure (Kim and Lyon, 2011). Table 1 provides a 
summary of the variables used in the model specification.  
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
4. Sample and results 
4.1 Sample 
Company-level data for this study are collected from the Bloomberg database, country-
level data on GDP and corporate governance are from the World Bank. The date of enforcement 
of the Kyoto Protocol per country is collected from the United Nations website.   
Our initial sample comprised all firms having climate change information in the 
Bloomberg database. This consisted of 2,094 firms worldwide for the period 2006 to 2014 with 
a maximum 18,846 firm-year observations, but the size of our final sample depends on the 
availability of data for each variable included in the model specification. This yields a total of 
1,607 firms with 9,120 firm-year observations from 45 countries worldwide, comprising 1,392 
firms from developed countries (8,121 firm-year observations) and 215 firms from developing 
countries (999 firm-year observations). The United States, Japan and Britain have the highest 
number of observations, while Malta, Mauritius and United Arab Emirates have the lowest.   
4.2 Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations for the common 
sample of 9,120 firm-year observations. The average company has a Tobin’s Q ratio (CEP) of 
1.57, greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) of 4.82 million metric tonnes, an environmental 
disclosure score (CED) of 35.55 points, a sales revenue (SIZE) of 15,365.10 million USD, a 
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financial leverage (LEV) of 82 percent and originates in a country with a gross domestic 
product per capita (GDP) of 43,646.77 USD. The average company spends over 1,000 million 
USD on capital expenditure (CAP). 
About 89 percent of companies have reported introducing an energy efficiency policy 
(ENG) to reduce their environmental footprint, and 32 percent are in the industrial, energy and 
utility sectors (IND). 63 percent have climate change policies (CHP) to reduce GHG and 80 
percent originate from countries where the Kyoto Protocol is in force (KYO). The average 
board size (BSZ) is about 11 persons, the average percentage of women on the board of 
directors (WOB) is 13.27 percent, and 27 percent of companies have their company's chief 
executive officer (CEO) as the chairman of the board. Finally, the first principal component of 
corporate governance at country level (CCGP) has an average score of 0.13. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
We comment briefly on some of the Spearman correlations in Table 2. The pairwise 
correlations between CEP, CED and GHG are all significant at the one percent level (two-
tailed). The correlations between CEP and each of GHG and CED are negative, indicating that 
good environmental performance (lower GHG) and less environmental disclosure are 
associated with better economic performance. The positive correlation between GHG and CED 
(poor environmental performance is correlated with more environmental disclosure) is 
consistent with the legitimacy theory referred to in the literature review section.  
Higher investment in tangible assets (CAP) is significantly and positively correlated 
with GHG (higher investment is associated with poorer environmental performance) and CED 
(more investment is associated with more environmental disclosure), but significantly and 
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negatively correlated with CEP. Interestingly, companies with initiatives to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions such as ENG and CHP have higher greenhouse gas emissions (correlations 0.121 
and 0.250 respectively), and disclose more environmental information (correlations 0.366 and 
0.454 respectively), results which again are consistent with legitimacy theory. They also have 
a significant but negative correlation with economic performance (correlations -0.060 and -
0.139 respectively). Firms from countries where the Kyoto Protocol is in force (KYO) have 
lower greenhouse gas emissions (good environmental performance) and higher environmental 
disclosure but a worse economic performance.  
These results should be treated with caution since they focus only on pairwise 
correlations without considering the influence of other variables. The estimated coefficients 
from an appropriately specified structural model may yield different results and conclusions.  
4.3 Estimation procedure and results 
Our main interest is in the full sample results, but we also consider the possibility that 
stages of economic development play a role in the CEP, CED and GHG relationships. 
Accordingly, we disaggregate between developed and developing countries using the United 
Nations classification and estimate equations (1) to (3) on the full, developed and developing 
country samples. Amongst other factors, the disaggregation may help control for inter-country 
technology differences (e.g., Czerny and Letmathe, 2017), which is an omitted variable in our 
model because of the lack of an appropriate metric.  
In response to Ullman’s (1985) critique, we test for endogeneity of the right-hand side 
variables CEP and GHG. Endogeneity, if it exists, implies that single equation OLS and GLS 
estimators are biased and inconsistent, i.e. they do not converge to their true population values 
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no matter how large the sample size is.  A Hausman test (results not tabulated) indicates the 
existence of endogeneity between CEP and GHG. Accordingly, we conduct system estimation 
of equations (1) to (3).  
Three system estimation methods are considered: three-stage least squares (3SLS), full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) and the generalised method of moments (GMM). We 
choose between them by comparing the standard errors of the regressions. Using the R-squared 
or adjusted R-squared in system estimation is not recommended because the statistic is 
unbounded below zero and often produces negative values. In all three samples (full, developed 
and developing countries) FIML has the highest standard error of the regression, and in two 
(full and developed countries) GMM has the lowest. Accordingly, we use GMM in the full and 
developed country samples. GMM does not compute for developing countries because of a 
near singular matrix (possibly due to the relatively small number of observations), thus we use 
3SLS instead.  
Table 3 shows the system estimation results. In total there are 99 estimated coefficients 
(33 per sample) of which a high number (80) are statistically significant, a significance rate of 
just over 80 percent. There are 66 coefficients significant at the 1 percent level, 10 at the 5 
percent level, and 4 at the 10 percent level. As an indicator of statistical scope and performance, 
we compare our full sample results with the system estimation results of Al-Tuwaijri et al. 
(2004, Table 3). In this latter study there are 19 estimated coefficients of which 12 are 
significant, 8 at the 1 percent level. Our full sample has 33 estimated coefficients of which 28 
are significant, 25 at the 1 percent level. We now comment on each equation in turn. 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
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Equation One: dependent variable CEP (corporate economic performance) 
The key result is the negative and highly significant coefficient on GHG in all three 
samples. After controlling for prior environmental disclosure, financial leverage, capital 
spending, firm size, board characteristics, GDP per capita, and corporate governance at country 
level, we find that the lower the firm’s GHG, the better its economic performance and vice 
versa. In other words, good environmental performance is associated with good economic 
performance across a wide range of companies, countries and time.  The negative coefficient 
is also consistent with the negative correlation in Table 2.  
The coefficient on CED(-1) is positive and significant in the full and developing country 
samples, consistent with results from Freedman and Patten (2004), Clarkson et al. (2013), and 
Plumlee et al. (2015), but negative and significant for developed countries, implying that 
greater prior environmental disclosure is associated with a worse current economic 
performance (Shane and Spicer, 1983; Stevens, 1984; Richardson and Welker, 2001). Possible 
explanations for the negative association are that poor environmental performers who disclose 
this fact are subsequently punished by financial markets or, alternatively, firms can hide “bad 
news” by disclosing less environmental information and artificially boosting their bottom line.  
The negative and highly significant SIZE coefficients for the full and developed country 
samples suggest that the economic performance of larger firms may be adversely affected by 
the presence of diseconomies of scale, consistent with results from Misani and Pogutz (2015) 
and Nollet et al. (2016). The positive SIZE coefficient for the developing countries sample is 
not necessarily a counterfactual, since these countries might have smaller firms that are less 
prone to diseconomies of scale. All the coefficients on CAP and LEV are significant. The 
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positive sign on CAP (in contrast to the negative correlation in Table 2) and negative sign on 
LEV implies that better economic performance is associated with higher capital spending and 
lower financial leverage, as expected, although the CAP coefficient is negative for developing 
countries.  
The association between CEP and board size (BSZ) is negative and highly significant 
for the full and developing country samples, but insignificant for developed countries. The 
association between CEP and CEO duality (CEO) is positive and highly significant for 
developed countries, but insignificant elsewhere. The significant results are consistent with 
those from Walls et al. (2012), where smaller board size and CEO duality are associated with 
better economic performance. Having more women on the board of directors (WOB) is 
positively associated with economic performance in all three samples, highly significant in the 
full and developed country samples, but insignificant for developing countries.  Economic 
performance is positively and significantly associated with GDP (as expected) in the full and 
developed country samples, but negatively for developing countries. Corporate governance at 
country level (CCGP) is negatively associated with CEP in the full sample (an unexpected 
result), insignificant in the developed countries sample, and positive in the developing 
countries sample.  
Equation Two: dependent variable GHG (environmental performance) 
There is a negative coefficient on CEP in all three samples, consistent with the negative 
coefficients on GHG in equation (1). In terms of significance, however, the situation is less 
clear. The coefficient on CEP is insignificant in the full sample, and significant only at the 10 
percent level in the sub-samples. Whilst GHG is a highly significant explanatory variable for 
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CEP in all three samples, the reverse is not the case. This is an important corroborative result, 
because it reinforces the findings of the causality testing in section 4.4.  
 The positive and highly significant coefficient on CED(-1) in all three samples implies 
that more prior environmental disclosure is associated with more GHG (bad environmental 
performance), a result inconsistent with the “lower bound” model of Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), 
but consistent with the gaming model of Li et al. (1997) where good environmental performers 
choose to disclose less through fear of litigation if greater disclosure might result in reputational 
damage. Alternatively, firms may feel it necessary or prudent to signal the possibility of poor 
performance to investors, thereby reducing the possibility of shareholder litigation if firm value 
falls. The coefficients on SIZE and IND are positive and highly significant across the three 
samples, consistent with Walls et al. (2012) and implying that larger firms and firms from the 
energy, industry and utility sectors produce more GHG, ceteris paribus. As expected, energy 
efficiency policy (ENG) is significantly and negatively associated with GHG in the full sample, 
although insignificant in the developed and developing country samples.  
Walls et al. (2012) and Lewis et al. (2014) find that larger boards and CEO duality are 
associated with more GHG. Our results for CEO support this latter finding: the CEO coefficient 
is positive in all three samples, and significant in two. The results for BSZ are mixed, since the 
coefficient is insignificant in two samples and has a sign change. It is a similar story for WOB, 
which is negatively (positively) associated with GHG in developed (developing) countries, but 
has no significance in the full sample. The GDP and CCGP coefficients are significant in all 
samples but exhibit sign reversal between developed and developing countries. The GDP 
(CCGP) signs are positive (negative) in the full and developed country samples but negative 
(positive) for developing countries. One explanation might be that poorer countries starting 
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with “dirty” production technologies are able to substitute cleaner technologies as GDP 
increases, an opportunity less available to developed countries. The positive CCGP sign for 
developing countries is more problematic because it implies that firms in poorer countries with 
improving country level corporate governance emit more GHG, even after controlling for GDP.  
Equation Three: dependent variable CED (corporate environmental disclosure) 
The association between CED and each of CEP and GHG is highly significant in all 
samples, but there is sign reversal. The coefficient sign is positive for the full and developing 
country samples, implying that better economic and worse environmental performance are each 
associated with more environmental disclosure, but negative for developed countries. The 
negative sign implies that worse economic and better environmental performance are each 
associated with more disclosure. These mixed results reflect the contrasting theoretical 
perspectives noted earlier in relation to environmental disclosure.   
The SIZE coefficients are positive and highly significant, as expected, for the full and 
developed country samples, but negative and insignificant for developing countries. The CHP 
coefficients are positive and highly significant, as expected, in all three samples. The 
association between KYO and CED is positive and highly significant for the full sample, 
implying that companies originating in countries where the Kyoto Protocol is in force disclose 
more than non-signatories, a result consistent with Kim and Lyon (2011), although the 
coefficients in the sub-samples are insignificant. 
The coefficients on BSZ are positive and highly significant for all samples, implying 
that larger boards have higher disclosure. The CEO coefficients are positive and highly 
significant in the full and developed country samples, although negative and insignificant for 
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developing countries. The coefficient on WOB is highly significant in the three samples, but 
positive for developed countries and negative and significant in the full and developing country 
samples. As expected, there is a significant and positive association between environmental 
disclosure and GDP per capita in all samples. Finally, corporate governance mechanisms at 
country level (CCGP) are negatively associated with CED in all samples, significant for both 
developed and developing countries but insignificant for the full sample. The negative 
coefficient implies that corporate environmental disclosure increases as corporate governance 
at country-level worsens, an unexpected result but one which may be explicable in terms of 
legitimacy theory, i.e. companies in a country with deteriorating governance might disclose 
more in order to legitimise a poor environmental performance to domestic and international 
environmental agencies.  
4.4 Stationarity and Granger causality tests  
Standard regression analysis demonstrates the association between variables, but not 
causality (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014). The issue of testing for causality is complex, but a 
widely used method is that of Granger (1969). Some argue that the test is “quasi-causal” and 
hence prefer the term “Granger causation”, a practice we follow in the subsequent analysis.        
Applying the Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether CEP, for example, 
causes GHG is to examine whether the current value of GHG can be explained by its past 
values and then to examine whether adding lagged values of CEP improves the explanation. 
The regressions are conducted within a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. The test is 
strictly temporal in nature, relying on the fact that the past can be used to predict the future but 
not vice versa. We distinguish these causation tests from our earlier estimations of equations 
(1) to (3) by continuing to refer to the latter as tests of association. More generally, to test 
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whether “X Granger-causes Y”, an unrestricted regression including lagged values of Y and X 
is compared to a restricted regression (null hypothesis) including only lagged values of Y. For 
a VAR(2) model we have: 
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2t t t t t tY a a Y a Y b X b X e− − − −= + + + + +  (Unrestricted regression) 
0 1 1 2 2t t t tY a a Y a Y e− −= + + +             (Restricted regression) 
The F-statistic for the F-test is formulated as: 
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Where RSS is the residual sum of squares from the restricted (R) and unrestricted (U) 
regressions, p is the number of lagged restrictions, T is the sample size and k is the number of 
estimated parameters. The null hypothesis is that the b coefficients are zero. If the calculated F 
statistic is greater than the critical F statistic, we reject the null and conclude that X Granger-
causes Y. This procedure can be repeated for testing whether Y Granger-causes X. Rejection 
of both null hypotheses implies bilateral causation.  
The Granger causality test assumes that the variables in question are stationary, i.e. they 
do not contain a unit root. We test for the presence of a unit root using panel tests that have 
higher power than unit root tests based on individual time series. The Levin et al. (2002) test 
assumes a common autoregressive structure (common root) for all series, while the Im et al. 
(2003) test allows for different autoregressive coefficients (individual root). The test results for 
CEP, CED and GHG (not tabulated) show that in all cases the null hypothesis that the series 
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contains a unit root is rejected at the 1 percent significance level, implying strong evidence for 
the stationarity of these variables. We use a block exogeneity Wald test which enables multiple 
explanatory variables to be considered as causal candidates in the VAR. The test also handles 
the possibility that all lagged explanatory variable coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Our 
panel data spans nine annual observations (2006 to 2014), a length of time we believe is 
sufficient to conduct meaningful tests for Granger causality. But the test has drawbacks: the 
results are sensitive to the lag order employed in the VARs, and higher lag orders substantially 
reduce the number of observations. To deal with this problem, we conduct sequential tests 
using one, two, three and four lags and note the most consistent decision outcomes. The tests 
with one and two lags produce exactly the same decision outcomes for all cases, so we present 
the results of the tests using two lags in Table 4.  
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
The decision outcomes for the full and developed country samples are identical, so we 
report on the differences between the developed and developing country results. For developed 
countries, GHG Granger-causes CEP but not vice versa, CED Granger-causes CEP but not vice 
versa, and GHG Granger-causes CED (in this case at the 10 percent significance level) but not 
vice versa. The decision outcomes for the developing countries differ in the following respects: 
GHG does not Granger-cause CEP, and CED does not Granger-cause CEP. GHG, however, 
still Granger-causes CED, the only causality in this sample.  
This one-way causation appears to be a distinctive result in the causation literature, 
although this literature is much less extensive than that relating to tests of association in cross-
sectional studies. The meta-analytic review by Endrikat et al. (2014) concludes that, based on 
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the studies containing causation analysis, there is causation from corporate environmental 
performance to economic performance and limited evidence of reverse causation. In terms of 
corporate environmental disclosure and economic performance, Qiu et al. (2016) find that 
although environmental disclosure does not Granger-cause economic performance, there is 
some evidence of reverse causation. It should be noted, however, that our results are based on 
nine (consecutive) time periods whereas other studies generally have fewer time periods and 
occasionally use non-consecutive time periods. Exceptions are the studies by King and Lenox 
(2001) and Clarkson et al. (2011b), although the former considers environmental performance 
and economic performance but not environmental disclosure, whilst the latter analyses 
environmental performance and economic performance over the period 1990 to 2003 but the 
three-way relationship between economic performance, environmental performance and 
disclosure for a single time period only (year 2003). 
Finally, we conduct a number of sequential robustness checks on the model data and 
specification (results not tabulated). Variables with extreme values at the 5th and 95th 
percentile are winsorized, and we replace our proxy for economic performance (Tobin’s Q 
ratio) with two alternative proxies, namely return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
The results are qualitatively similar to our original results, apart from the association between 
environmental disclosure and economic performance in equation (3), where there is a positive 
association between CED and each of Tobin’s Q ratio and ROA but a negative association 
between CED and ROE. We also apply robustness checks to the causality tests and find that 
the results are qualitatively similar (results not tabulated). Overall, we conclude that our model 
is reasonably robust to these checks.  
36 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
Our model specification and estimation of the associations between CEP, CED and 
GHG yield a high proportion of significant coefficients, with two-thirds highly significant (i.e. 
at the 1 percent level). A compelling result is the role of environmental performance, measured 
by greenhouse gas emissions, as a highly significant explanatory variable for corporate 
economic performance: GHG is negatively and highly significantly related to CEP in equation 
(1) in all samples, implying that good environmental performance is strongly associated with 
good economic performance. But the reverse case is less compelling: CEP is a negative but 
insignificant explanatory variable for GHG in equation (2) in the full sample, and only 
significant at the 10 percent level in the sub-samples. An echo of this result occurs in the 
causation tests of Table 4, where GHG Granger-causes CEP (in the full and developed country 
samples) but CEP does not Granger-cause GHG in any samples. Overall, we conclude that in 
the GHG/CEP relationship, GHG is the dominant partner. 
Our main interest is in the full sample results, where 28 of the 33 estimated coefficients 
are significant; a significance rate of 85 percent. Of the 28 significant coefficients, 25 are highly 
significant. Where a firm prediction is made about the coefficient sign of the control variables, 
this prediction is usually accurate. For example, the variables SIZE, GDP, LEV and CAP have 
the expected signs, as do the dummy variables ENG, IND, CHP and KYO, and in nearly every 
case these coefficients are highly significant (with the exception of ENG which is significant 
at the 5 percent level). Only in the case of the association between CCGP and CEP is there a 
significant but unexpected coefficient sign.    
We do not possess a control variable for inter-country technology differences, so we 
disaggregate between developed and developing countries as a robustness check. In general, 
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the system estimation results for these sub-samples exhibit mixed correspondence in terms of 
coefficient sign and significance. For example, whilst LEV, IND and CHP are significant and 
have the expected sign in all three samples, the board variables BSZ, CEO and WOB exhibit 
less consistency (although there is a positive and significant association between the number 
of women on the board of directors and economic performance in the full and developed 
country samples). KYO is positive and significant in the full sample yet negative and 
insignificant in both sub-samples. One explanation for the mixed correspondence is that these 
distinct types of economy are structurally different and behave differently to the same stimulus, 
so pooling them together masks significant differences between them. Another explanation 
may be the small sample size of developing relative to developed countries.   
The split between developed and developing countries produces interesting results for 
the SIZE and GDP variables. SIZE and GHG are, as expected, positively and significantly 
associated in all the samples. The bigger the firm, the greater its GHG, ceteris paribus. There 
is a sign reversal for SIZE in relation to CEP, but this does not necessarily imply a lack of 
robustness: the negative sign for developed countries might occur via diseconomies of scale, 
in contrast to the positive sign (economies of scale) for developing countries. Another 
interesting sign reversal is that GDP and GHG are positively and negatively related in 
developed and developing countries respectively, suggesting that developing countries might 
be able to substitute clean for dirty technologies in the earlier stages of their growth cycle, an 
opportunity less available to more mature developed countries. The same sign reversal occurs 
for GDP and CEP, possibly because of a threshold effect whereby good economic performance 
depends on reaching a certain level of economic development.    
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The existence of a time lag between disclosure and environmental/economic 
performance suggests that prior rather than current disclosure should feature as the explanatory 
variable in model specification, and this is the basis for including CED(-1) in equations (1) and 
(2). But understanding the impact of prior environmental disclosure on CEP and GHG is 
problematic for a number of reasons, including the role played by company expectations and 
market reaction, the limited literature on prior disclosure (many studies investigate current 
rather than prior disclosure) and the different measures used for the disclosure variable. Indeed, 
the plethora of variable measures and the consequent non-comparability of studies is a problem 
plaguing research using environmental disclosure and performance variables, and one 
suggestion for future research is to achieve a greater standardisation of the variable metrics. 
Our measures of environmental disclosure and performance have the advantage that they are 
collected on a consistent basis across companies in many different countries and over time.  
There is a highly significant and positive association between CED(-1) and GHG in all 
samples, i.e. more prior environmental disclosure is associated with more current GHG, 
consistent with the gaming model of Li et al. (1997). The association between prior 
environmental disclosure and current economic performance is also highly significant in all 
samples, but positive in the full and developing country samples and negative for developed 
countries. This sign indeterminacy reflects the findings of the limited research literature on the 
CEP/CED(-1) relationship: a positive coefficient sign is found in Clarkson et al. (2013), for 
example, but a negative and insignificant sign in Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004). In view of these 
mixed results, and the sparseness of the literature, calls for further research on the impact of 
prior environmental disclosure appear justified.  
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There are also mixed results in the sub-samples for the association between CED in 
equation (3) and CEP and GHG. For developed countries CEP and GHG are negatively and 
significantly related to CED, but positively and significantly related in developing countries. 
These mixed results replicate those found in the research literature more generally, and to 
reiterate the point made in the preceding paragraph we suggest that one explanation could be 
the gaps in our understanding of the process and effects of environmental disclosure, 
particularly in developing countries. More research is needed to understand how the 
interactions between CEP, CED and GHG change at different stages of the economic growth 
cycle.  
A feature of the current study is its response to research calls to examine the direction 
of causation between CEP, CED and GHG and, by implication, whether prior environmental 
disclosure impacts current environmental performance. We find instances of a one-way 
causality but, in contrast to some studies, none of bi-directional causality. The role of 
environmental performance is central in these results. Our finding of a one-way Granger 
causation from GHG to CED is robust for all samples, and GHG Granger-causes CEP in the 
full and developed country samples. CED also has a one-way causal influence on CEP in the 
full and developed country samples which, by virtue of the nature of the Granger causality test, 
we construe as further evidence of the significant association between CED(-1) and CEP in the 
system estimation results. CEP, on the other hand, has no causal influence on either GHG or 
CED, results which hold in all samples. We also document non-causation from either CEP or 
CED or both to GHG. This result is robust for all samples and calls for further research to 
explore the factors causing variations in GHG.  
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Taken together, these association and causation results highlight the importance of 
environmental performance (measured by GHG) and, to a lesser extent, environmental 
disclosure, over economic performance. Some might find this a surprising result, and it is 
natural to consider the wider socio-economic factors which might explain it. The authors 
speculate that increasing domestic and international concern for the environment, evidenced 
particularly by the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, has created a global market place 
in which business strategy, especially amongst larger companies which are more exposed to 
the glare of the environmental spotlight, must pay at least as much attention to environmental 
as economic performance. Would the same result occur in a similar study conducted at any 
point in the latter half of the twentieth century? Probably not, because economic priorities 
dominated concerns over the environment. The backdrop to the twenty-first century is very 
different, and business strategy has generally adapted to it. We believe this is the change which 
accounts for our finding, although there is plenty of scope for further speculation.    
A limitation of our dataset is the small number of time periods in relation to cross-
sections. Whilst this limitation is a common feature of panel data, additional time periods 
would be welcome. These will accrue naturally with the passage of time, and represent an 
important avenue for future research. More generally, whilst there has been no shortage of 
cross-sectional studies on the relations between economic performance and environmental 
performance and disclosure, future research can focus on extending the temporal aspects of the 
analysis. This would be especially useful for understanding model dynamics, particularly the 
role of current and prior environmental disclosure. Lack of temporal data notwithstanding, to 
the best of the authors’ knowledge the current study has more time periods than others in this 
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area. It should be noted, however, that the study is potentially geared towards larger firms 
(average annual sales of $15 billion). 
To conclude, the current study uses a relatively large panel dataset, together with 
greenhouse gas emissions as the environmental performance metric and a more objective 
measure of environmental disclosure, to estimate a simultaneous equation system across many 
countries as well as companies, thus providing greater generality and statistical precision in the 
estimation results. The model contains a wide range of firm and country-level control variables 
and passes a number of robustness checks in relation to tests of association and causation, 
although there is a need for further research in the context of the split between developed and 
developing countries. In particular, the results demonstrate strong evidence of a one-way 
causation from environmental performance and disclosure to economic performance, but no 
evidence of reverse causation. They also show strong evidence of a one-way causation from 
environmental performance to environmental disclosure and no evidence of reverse causation.  
Future research could examine whether these results hold for different measures of 
environmental performance, assuming that other general measures are available. Overall, we 
believe that both the association and causation results in this paper represent an advance in the 
empirical literature towards a firmer foundation capable of informing business strategy at 
corporate level and government policy at national and international levels. The over-arching 
policy conclusion from the analysis is that environmental performance, as measured by 
greenhouse gas emissions, is the corner stone in the CEP, CED and GHG troika. Thus, to 
improve economic performance and transparency at firm level, business strategy must pay very 
close attention to environmental performance. Environmental policy matters, not only for the 
environment but the economy as well. 
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Table 1: Variable measurement summary 
Variable Measurement 
CEP Corporate economic performance measured by Tobin’s Q ratio calculated as the sum of   
market capitalisation, total liabilities, preferred equity and minority interest, divided by 
total assets. 
GHG Corporate environmental performance measured by greenhouse gas emissions (millions of 
metric tonnes) or, if unavailable, by carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
CED Corporate environmental disclosure score, which is a proprietary Bloomberg score based 
on the extent of a company's environmental disclosure. 
SIZE Firm size measured by turnover (US$ millions) less an adjustment for items such as returns 
and discounts. 
LEV Financial leverage measured as net debt to equity as a proxy for financial risk. 
CAP Capital expenditure as a proxy for the efficiency of a firm in deployment of its assets. 
BSZ The number of full time directors on the company's board. 
CEO A dummy variable which equals one if the company's chief executive officer is also the 
chairman of the board and zero if the two roles are separate. 
WOB The proportion of women on the board of directors. 
CHP A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a climate change policy describing its 
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through its ongoing operations and/or 
the use of its products and services and zero otherwise. 
ENG A dummy variable that equals one if the company has reported implementing initiatives to 
make its energy use more efficient and zero if the company has not explicitly disclosed any 
such efforts in its annual or company responsibility reports. 
IND A dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the industrial, energy or utility sectors 
according to the Bloomberg Industry Classification System (BICS) and zero otherwise.   
GDP The gross domestic product per capita (US$ current prices) in the firm’s country of origin. 
KYO A dummy variable which equals one if the Kyoto Protocol is in force in the firm’s country of 
origin and zero otherwise. 
CCGP The first principal component of corporate governance indicators at country level. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlation matrix  
  CEP GHG CED SIZE LEV CAP BSZ CEO WOB ENG CHP IND KYO GDP CCGP 
Panel A: Spearman correlation matrix 
CEP 1                             
GHG -0.078a 1                           
CED -0.089a 0.251a 1                         
SIZE -0.111a 0.537a 0.297a 1                       
LEV -0.251a 0.219a 0.036a 0.142a 1                     
CAP -0.078a 0.723a 0.315a 0.698a 0.261a 1                   
BSZ -0.090a 0.283a 0.216a 0.449a 0.122a 0.398a 1                 
CEO 0.005 0.147a 0.079a 0.208a -0.029a 0.165a 0.130a 1               
WOB 0.158a -0.012 -0.067a 0.073a 0.040a 0.001 0.027b -0.051a 1             
ENG -0.060a 0.121a 0.366a 0.139a 0.043a 0.152a 0.079a 0.020c -0.020c 1           
CHP -0.139a 0.250a 0.454a 0.254a 0.062a 0.283a 0.146a 0.069a -0.080a 0.309a 1         
IND -0.049a 0.264a 0.017c 0.001 0.095a 0.122a -0.019c 0.055a -0.127a -0.021b 0.059a 1       
KYO -0.208a -0.185a 0.095a -0.174a 0.000 -0.139a -0.090a -0.387a -0.241a 0.122a 0.147a 0.009 1     
GDP 0.090a -0.008 -0.110a 0.051a -0.001 0.014 -0.164a 0.027c 0.359a -0.070a -0.164a -0.026b -0.380a 1   
CCGP 0.051a -0.123a -0.172a -0.111a -0.019c -0.113a -0.260a -0.292a 0.253a -0.065a -0.148a -0.036a 0.145a 0.618a 1 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
Mean 1.57   4.82 35.55 15365   0.82 1066 11.21 0.27 13.27 0.89 0.63 0.32 0.80 43647 0.13 
STD 1.28 15.92 14.08 21151 23.28 2139    3.44 0.45 11.36 0.31 0.48 0.47 0.40 16464 2.01 
N= 9,120 firm-year observations. Superscripts a, b, c: correlations are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (2-tailed) respectively.
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Table 3: System estimation results 
  Full Sample Developed countries Developing countries 
Dependent 
variable 
CEP GHG CED CEP GHG CED CEP GHG CED 
Intercept 0.981a 
(0.000) 
-8.013a 
(0.003) 
-0.262 
(0.948) 
1.705a 
(0.000) 
-12.136a 
(0.000) 
36.936a 
(0.000) 
2.055a 
(0.000) 
0.974 
(0.878) 
-11.543 
(0.219) 
CEP 
 
-1.659 
(0.234) 
11.616a 
(0.000) 
 
-2.759c 
(0.062) 
-10.645a 
(0.000) 
 
-3.325c 
(0.085) 
14.716a 
(0.000) 
GHG -0.037a 
(0.000) 
 
0.258a 
(0.000) 
-0.026a 
(0.000) 
 
-0.119a 
(0.001) 
-0.071a 
(0.007) 
 
1.380a 
(0.000) 
CED(-1) 0.014a 
(0.000) 
0.041a 
(0.007) 
 
-0.015a 
(0.000) 
0.078a 
(0.000) 
 
0.044a 
(0.000) 
0.301a 
(0.000) 
 
SIZE -3.3E-06a 
(0.000) 
1.4E-04a 
(0.000) 
7.4E-05a 
(0.000) 
-1.8E-06a 
(0.000) 
1.4E-04a 
(0.000) 
4.1E-05a 
(0.000) 
1.8E-05a 
(0.000) 
1.6E-04a 
(0.000) 
-8.1E-05 
(0.123) 
BSZ -0.026a 
(0.000) 
0.264a 
(0.002) 
0.677a 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.140) 
0.113 
(0.177) 
0.527a 
(0.000) 
-0.074a 
(0.001) 
-0.114 
(0.556) 
0.739a 
(0.006) 
CEO 0.037 
(0.115) 
1.010b 
(0.038) 
1.584a 
(0.000) 
0.085a 
(0.000) 
1.752a 
(0.003) 
1.029b 
(0.014) 
0.334 
(0.134) 
1.448 
(0.325) 
-4.665c 
(0.061) 
WOB 0.010a 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.918) 
-0.186a 
(0.000) 
0.015a 
(0.000) 
-0.044b 
(0.011) 
0.119a 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.426) 
0.083b 
(0.040) 
-0.201a 
(0.005) 
GDP 7.1E-06a 
(0.000) 
1.8E-04a 
(0.000) 
3.8E-05c 
(0.062) 
2.9E-06b 
(0.017) 
2.5E-04a 
(0.000) 
4.6E-05b 
(0.026) 
-6.0E-05a 
(0.000) 
-2.9E-04b 
(0.014) 
0.001a 
(0.000) 
CCGP -0.091a 
(0.003) 
-0.823a 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.981) 
-0.001 
(0.924) 
-0.387a 
(0.005) 
-0.574a 
(0.000) 
0.319a 
(0.000) 
1.837a 
(0.003) 
-5.021a 
(0.000) 
LEV -0.001a 
(0.000) 
  
-2.9E-04b 
(0.025) 
  
-0.083b 
(0.013) 
  
CAP 8.6E-05a 
(0.000) 
  
5.9E-05a 
(0.000) 
  
-1.1E-04a 
(0.008) 
  
ENG 
 
-1.377b 
(0.014) 
  
0.743 
(0.186) 
  
-0.123 
(0.926) 
 
IND 
 
4.429a 
(0.000) 
  
4.736a 
(0.000) 
  
3.889a 
(0.005) 
 
CHP 
  
10.196a 
(0.000) 
  
8.895a 
(0.000) 
  
5.930a 
(0.000) 
KYO 
  
3.668a 
(0.000) 
  
-0.374 
(0.727) 
  
-4.244 
(0.582) 
S.E. of  
regression 
1.16 15.34 17.14 1.05 15.87 16.07 1.56 11.55 24.03 
N 7513 7513 7513 6729 6729 6729 784 784 784 
P-values in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, c: correlations are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (two-tailed) 
respectively. Full and developed country samples estimated by GMM, developing countries by 3SLS. 
  
  
51 
 
Table 4: Granger causality tests 2006–2014 
Null hypothesis Full sample 
 
Developed countries 
 
Developing countries 
 
  Wald-stat. Decision Wald-stat. Decision Wald-stat. Decision 
Dependent variable: CEP 
      
GHG does not Granger-cause CEP 11.648a 
(0.003) 
Reject 13.287a 
(0.001) 
Reject 0.317 
(0.854) 
Accept 
CED does not Granger-cause CEP 9.271a 
(0.010) 
Reject 15.041a 
(0.001) 
Reject 2.592 
(0.274) 
Accept 
GHG, CED do not Granger-cause CEP  22.467a 
(0.000) 
Reject 29.555a 
(0.000) 
Reject 3.045 
(0.550) 
Accept 
  
      
Dependent variable: GHG 
      
CEP does not Granger-cause GHG 0.714 
(0.700) 
Accept 1.154 
(0.562) 
Accept 0.988 
(0.610) 
Accept 
CED does not Granger-cause GHG 1.314 
(0.518) 
Accept 0.513 
(0.774) 
Accept 4.268 
(0.118) 
Accept 
CEP, CED do not Granger-cause GHG 2.100 
(0.717) 
Accept 1.691 
(0.792) 
Accept 4.925 
(0.295) 
Accept 
       
Dependent variable: CED  
      
CEP does not Granger-cause CED 1.586 
(0.453) 
Accept 3.838 
(0.147) 
Accept 2.962 
(0.227) 
Accept 
GHG does not Granger-cause CED 10.065a 
(0.007) 
Reject 5.253c 
(0.072) 
Reject 21.929c 
(0.000) 
Reject 
CEP, GHG do not Granger-cause CED 11.294b 
(0.024) 
Reject 8.952c 
(0.062) 
Reject 23.806c 
(0.000) 
Reject 
N 6042  5452  590  
P-values in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, c: correlations are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (two-tailed) 
respectively. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the explanatory variable Granger-causes the dependent 
variable. VAR lag length =2. 
 
 
